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Introduction
The review of Peruvian exchange rate policies during the last fifty years prompts several
questions.  First, why did the government choose some exchange rate regimes over
others? Second, why did governments target certain exchange rate levels? Third, why, in
certain episodes, did governments refuse to abandon an exchange rate peg?
With respect to the choice of the exchange rate regime, the obvious extreme
alternatives are fixed and pure floating, with several intermediate categories such as fixed
rates with discrete realignments, crawling pegs, bands, and dirty floats. By choosing one
exchange rate regime, a government simultaneously selects other underlying objectives.
The most common tradeoff mentioned in the literature is that between volatility and
flexibility. A fixed exchange rate is assumed to reduce volatility in the real exchange rate
(RER)—to the extent that prices are one order of magnitude less volatile—but this limits
government’s ability to counteract unanticipated real shocks.  On the other hand, a flexible
exchange rate allows the implementation of a discretionary policy to react to real shocks.
This policy, however, is usually associated with a higher degree of RER volatility.
1
However, in countries such as Peru that have experienced high chronic inflation, the
relationship between real and nominal exchange rate volatility apparently breaks down: an
increase in the volatility in the nominal exchange rate does not necessarily imply an
increase in volatility of the real exchange rate.
2 So the volatility-flexibility tradeoff is
mitigated, and other factors need to be taken into account to explain such choices.  Most
notably, to the extent that inflation does not necessarily converge to international levels,
the choice is not primarily between volatility and discretion, but between competitiveness
and inflation. A fixed exchange rate provides a nominal anchor that can help to build the
credibility necessary to fight inflation. At the same time, however, a pegged rate more
often than not results in a real exchange rate appreciation that can jeopardize the viability
of external accounts.
With this framework in mind, the first task is to explain the adoption of particular
                                                       
1  See Obstfeld (1997).
2  See, for example, Bufman and Leiderman (1995).4
exchange rate regimes in Peru during the last fifty years. In that respect, Peru’s experience
has been particularly rich, because almost every exchange rate system has been
implemented. Two episodes, however, deserve special attention. The first is the adoption
of a fixed exchange rate—de facto in the late 1950s and de jure in 1961—in a period
when the country was experiencing high GDP growth rates. Factors contributing to this
choice included an increasing urban population, disenchantment with laissez-faire policies
after years of terms of trade volatility, and the adoption of inward-oriented policies by
other countries in the region. The second episode is the adoption of a flexible exchange
rate in the 1990s, when most high-inflation countries had opted for exchange rate-based
stabilization. This choice of exchange rate regimes apparently resulted from initial
economic conditions, such as the lack of reserves to commit to a credible peg, and indirect
pressure by the IMF. It also seems that the system has been maintained until now mainly
because of the political costs—and risks—of switching regimes.
A discussion of the second question, why governments have targeted certain
exchange rate levels, assumes that the government has some discretion over the exchange
rate level. Empirical studies show that even if in the longer run the RER converges to
purchasing power parity (PPP)—probably adjusted by productivity gains—in the short run
there are important deviations from productivity-adjusted PPP. That suggests that short-
term monetary and fiscal policies can affect the exchange rate level. To target a more
depreciated exchange rate to increase competitiveness or to solve a balance of payments
crisis is usually done at the expense of higher inflation. Peru’s exchange rate policy during
the last fifty years shows certain periods—most of the 1960s and early 1970s, the mid-
1980s and most of the 1990s—in which the RER seems to be appreciated with respect to
its equilibrium value. Thus, one of the main objectives of this study will be to understand
why and how the government endured, or sometimes induced, such misalignment.
The third relevant question is related to the appropriate timing for abandoning an
exchange rate peg. There are at least two approaches. One requires  a devaluation,
followed by fixing at a new level, and another is to introduce a more flexible system. In
general, those shifts are associated with huge political costs because they have short-term
contractionary implications. For this reason pegs are in several cases abandoned too late.5
There are at least three episodes in Peru during the last fifty years in which
required exchange rate adjustments were postponed: in the 1960s, in the early 1970s and
from 1985 to 1987. While econometric techniques cannot readily test an exchange rate
switch, a narrative section below discusses the first of these episodes in detail.
The history of Peruvian exchange rates demonstrates that interest group pressures,
as well as overall policy orientation, help to explain both the choice of exchange rate
regime and the degree of misalignment.  The industrial sector oriented to the domestic
market (both entrepreneurs and unions) pushed for a protectionist tariff level, a fixed
exchange rate regime and a stronger (appreciated) currency. When tariffs were low,
however, they were less prone to accept an overvalued real exchange rate. The results also
suggest that export subsidies played a role in compensating the export sector, reducing
pressures for a more depreciated currency. These results must be viewed with caution,
however, due to the difficulty of estimating from relatively small samples and the limited
capacity of the measures used to proxy for underlying economic variables.
Peruvian Exchange Rate Policies during the Last Fifty Years
Over the last five decades Peru has experimented with a variety of exchange rate regimes.
During this time exchange rate policy has served a variety of purposes, such as providing a
nominal anchor to fight inflation, an instrument to promote international competitiveness,
and an important relative price within a set of policies aimed at industrializing the country.
By any standards, Peru was an outward-oriented economy in the 1950s (for
example, the ratio of exports plus imports to GDP exceeded 45% in 1960).  Exports were
concentrated in agricultural and mining products, and economic policies were basically
laissez-faire.  Unlike most Latin American nations, which had a fixed nominal exchange
rate during the 1950s, Peru opted for a floating exchange rate regime after a negative
experience with fixed exchange rates in the mid-1940s.
3 This regime was maintained until
1954, when the Central Bank increased its intervention in the foreign exchange market.
                                                       
3  Peru was the only Latin American country that did not introduce exchange rate controls after the Great
Depression.  See Rojas (1996).6
During most of the 1950s, however, exchange rate policy was designed to maintain a
weak (i.e., depreciated) real exchange rate in order to raise the domestic currency price of
exportables (most of which were commodities).  Thus, when the terms of trade
deteriorated in 1957, generating a balance of payment crisis, the currency was devalued by
20% in January 1958.  This devaluation was followed by a large-scale, by-the-book
stabilization program in 1959.
However, in the mid-1950s a development paradigm based on exporting raw
materials was already being questioned. The instability of raw material prices and CEPAL
theories of economic development encouraged a gradual policy shift in favor of the
incipient manufacturing sector as opposed to the still-powerful export sector. As Thorp
and Bertram (1978, p. 262) state: “A turning point for industrialization can thus be
identified in the last year or so of the Odria government, as a new generation of
manufacturing ventures came on to the scene. The new firms of the 1950s represented the
first steps in a diversion of the local elite interest away from export activities and toward
non-export sectors, including manufacturing.”
In addition to the stabilization package, the “Ley de Promoción Industrial” was
also enacted in 1959.  This law, originally proposed in 1955, could be considered the first
effort to promote industrialization by means of an import substitution strategy.
Within this new development paradigm, exchange rate intervention was increased,
and finally the exchange rate was fixed in February 1961.  As discussed further below,  an
appreciated rate was consistent with the need to provide cheap foodstuffs to the growing
urban population as well as cheap inputs and equipment to the industrial sector.  The
exchange rate regime was also linked to other policies. For example, tariffs were raised
substantially in order to protect manufacturers of final goods for the domestic market.
Simultaneously, though, tariff exemptions were granted to intermediate and capital goods
demanded by the industrial sector. These measures were complemented by an Agrarian
Reform that was timidly launched in the southern part of the country.
A fixed exchange rate, coupled with an inflation rate of 83% between 1961 and
1967–well above international levels and without major changes in productivity–generated
a very strong appreciation of the real exchange rate.  The strong anti-export bias was7
reflected in a deterioration of the trade balance.  This time the government was
reluctant to devalue, but a speculative attack forced a 44.3% devaluation in September
1967.
Economic failure—made obvious by the exchange rate devaluation—prompted a
military coup in 1968.  The new military government considered the previously
implemented import substitution measures insufficient and embarked on a package of
reforms that constituted one of the most radical import substitution programs in Latin
America.  The Agrarian Reform and a far-reaching nationalization of mining and oil
companies seriously affected those economic groups that could push for a higher RER,
and Peru’s economy entered a stage of maintaining a strong RER as a precondition for
achieving industrialization.
The Agrarian Reform and the nationalization of mining and petroleum companies
severely affected the ability of exporters, concentrated in agricultural and mining, to
pressure the government for a devalued exchange rate; the new policies displayed a
marked pro-industrial bias. Additionally, land reform in the coastal region implied the
transfer of vast “haciendas” to workers who were not ready to manage them; sugar and
cotton exports consequently began to decline. The new agricultural cooperativas, for their
part, were never able to organize themselves into a pressure group.  At the same time, the
administration of the State Mining companies followed political imperatives rather than
economic principles, subsidizing the emerging industrial sector through low energy prices
and an overvalued exchange rate.
The new government kept the nominal exchange fixed, enacted a new industrial
law, the Ley General de Industrias in 1970, and increased protection even further. A
favorable evolution in the terms of trade and the discovery of oil in Peru’s interior during
the first oil shock nonetheless allowed the country to access financial international
markets, which were glutted with petrodollars at the time.  As a consequence, during 1973
and 1974 the government could subsidize oil and foodstuffs without adjusting the
exchange rate. The gradual increase in manufacturing’s share of GDP, as well as the
growing process of urbanization, contributed to shaping new powerful economic groups8
interested in keeping a strong RER and a highly restrictive tariff structure.
Once favorable international prices and lending disappeared, the economy’s
weaknesses became apparent.  In addition, oil reserves proved to be much lower than
initially expected.  A steep deterioration in the terms of trade, which began in 1974, and a
fiscal deficit produced a balance of payments crisis in 1975. These conditions forced a
change in the military government, which imposed adjustment measures that included a
45% devaluation after eight years of fixed rates.
Peru’s economic difficulties exacerbated the country’s social tensions. While
industrialists supported the regime, labor unions organized the first general strike. It was
during this period that the Central Bank regained control of economic policy making, at
least partially as result of pressure from foreign creditors and the  IMF. Subsequent
adjustment measures included a new devaluation in June 1976, followed by the
implementation of a crawling peg system.  In July of 1977 the exchange rate was fixed
again, followed by a very short period of dirty float and the implementation of a pre-
announced crawling peg system in 1978. Current account deficits of 8.9% in 1976 and
7.7% in 1977 forced the government to implement other policies to reduce aggregate
demand. Nonetheless, given that the government could still access some foreign funds, it
did not implement a coherent stabilization program until 1978.
During the 1975-1977 period the government was reluctant to apply a drastic
stabilization program because of the social cost of such a package. The resulting use of
partial or incomplete measures generated growing imbalances.  It is interesting to compare
the unwillingness to adjust in this period with the relative ease with which stabilization
packages were implemented during the 1950s.  As mentioned above, when terms of trade
deteriorated in 1957, the government was quick to undertake a by-the-book stabilization
program.  However, after more than a decade of import substitution, the industrial sector
and urban workers, accustomed to subsidized food and energy prices, constituted a group
that would not readily accept either a devaluation or a tax increase.  Indeed, 1978 was one
of the country’s worst years for strikes, and public school attendance was suspended for
several months because of a general strike organized by the teachers’ union.
The first serious stabilization program aimed at reducing the level of expenditure9
was implemented in 1978, when political discontent, the external sector’s critical situation
and the lack of access to external credit allowed no other option.  In that year,
the military government announced a timetable to amend the Constitution and hold
democratic elections in 1980.
During those years, the promotion of nontraditional exports, a process begun in
the 1960s, was intensified.  Between 1976 and 1978 the real exchange rate depreciated
60% while, from 1975 to 1979, non-traditional exports increased eightfold.
The dramatic improvement in terms of trade in 1979-1980 helped to reverse the
current account situation and almost automatically solved the public sector’s deficit.
Silver prices increased quadrupled between 1978 and 1980, and the second oil shock
occurred shortly after Peru had opened an oil pipeline from the interior to a coastal port.
A 17% export tax, introduced as part of the 1978 stabilization package, allowed the
government to acquire a substantial share of the export boom’s revenues and improve
public sector accounts.
While capital inflows had not changed substantially, international reserves
accumulated.  The sudden export boom, and the related inflow of foreign exchange, both
occurring while the crawling peg system was maintained, forced an appreciation of the real
exchange rate.  As Peru’s financial markets were quite underdeveloped at that time, the
Central Bank lacked the instruments to sterilize the sudden inflow of foreign exchange,
and monetization of foreign reserves neutralized previous government efforts to reduce
inflation.  During those years the government prepaid some foreign debt, which had been
refinanced in previous years, and began to liberalize imports in order to reduce inflationary
pressures.
As the external disequilibrium was corrected, exchange rate policy was redirected
towards fighting inflation. In 1980, the newly elected Belaúnde administration launched an
aggressive investment plan based on the assumption that the improvement in terms of
trade was largely permanent.  Peru’s position at the time was enviable, with a favorable
external context and a newly elected democratic government. It was therefore easy for
Belaúnde’s government to launch an ambitious foreign indebtedness plan that was aimed10
mainly at the construction sector, including both roads and housing.
The favorable external situation of 1979 and 1980 was reversed in 1981 and 1982,
however, as the Peruvian economy experienced negative terms of trade shocks and higher
international interest rates. Again, the government was reluctant to adjust, apparently
hoping that the reversal in the terms of trade was only temporary, and devoted a
substantial part of foreign lending to cushioning the situation without taking any serious
stabilization measure.  Trade tariffs were also increased as a way to cope with the external
situation.
In 1981 the current account deficit reached 8% of GDP. When the external and
internal disequilibria were no longer tolerable, the government ended up undertaking
drastic measures to increase government savings and to pursue real exchange rate
devaluation.  In 1983, when Peru’s economy was hard-hit by the El Niño climatic effect,
GDP decreased by more than 13%. Much of this recession, though, stemmed from
underlying economic imbalances rather than climatic factors. Again the reluctance to
adjust to a negative external shock increased the magnitude of the imbalances, eventually
increasing the costs of adjustment. After the 1983 El Niño, the government hit bottom. It
stopped servicing international banks’ foreign debt and was forced to negotiate several
refinancing deals, as well as enter into IMF monitoring, which prompted an adjustment
plan.
Exchange rate policy went basically unmodified from the end of 1983, when the
crawl was accelerated, until the end of Belaúnde’s term in July 1985, as the government
maintained a high real exchange rate to ensure the country’s competitiveness.  This
approach, however, generated inflationary pressures, and the real terms prices of basic
items such as gasoline, water and electricity substantially increased in a context of growing
inflation. In the first months of 1985 inflation rose to an annual rate of around 250%, and
the country was immersed in an inflation-devaluation spiral. As a result of restrictive fiscal
and monetary measures, however, Peru achieved both fiscal and external balances. By the
end of Belaúnde’s term the country had US$1.5 billion in foreign reserves and the public
sector was running a surplus.
In August 1985, the newly elected García administration launched a heterodox11
stabilization program in the spirit of the Austral and Cruzado plans, using the exchange
rate as one of several anchors to reduce inflation.  As expected, freezing prices of most
products helped to reduce inflation.  In addition, expansive fiscal policies encouraged
growth, as GDP grew by 9.3% in 1986 and 8.3% in 1987.  However, the government did
not undertake major adjustments to the underlying sources of inflation, which remained
substantially above international levels.  While favorable starting conditions, such as a
relatively high stock of foreign reserves and healthy public sector finances, delayed a crisis,
the maintenance of price controls and a fixed exchange rate generated major distortions in
the economy, especially as  García limited foreign debt payments in order to direct
resources to domestic public expenditures.  By 1987 the underlying disequilibriums were
evident. The country was running out of foreign reserves, there was a drastic current
account deficit and the public deficit reached 5.7% of GDP.
In the following years, a multiple exchange rate system was introduced. This
system had two objectives that, under the circumstances, were inconsistent in the short
run: keeping inflation under control and avoiding an excessive deterioration of external
accounts. As expected, the system failed and a sharp reduction in aggregate demand,
serving as an automatic stabilizer, proved the only way to reduce the external deficit.
From early 1987 until the first months of 1990, the government implemented
several incomplete stabilization packages. A strong official rate for certain transactions
maintained the role of the exchange rate as an anchor to fight inflation. Although the
stabilization measures were somehow successful in regaining the external balance, a
growing public sector deficit continued to fuel inflation.  Towards the end of the term, and
trying to boost the chances of the official candidate, the government tried to generate a
small consumption boom with its remaining reserves. The attempt was a total failure.
While international reserves were depleted, the recession continued, and inflation in the
twelve months before July 1990 was almost 5,000%.
In August 1990, newly elected president Fujimori launched a comprehensive
stabilization program. Unlike other successful stabilization programs in the region, the
exchange rate was not pegged. On the contrary, the rate was allowed to float with a
certain degree of intervention, and the somewhat  contractionary monetary policy12
contributed to the appreciation of the real exchange rate.
4  The real exchange rate
generally remained strong in the following years. The Central Bank undertook limited
sterilized interventions with the objective of depreciating the RER, or at least avoiding
further appreciation, but without major success. These interventions were, moreover,
undertaken only to the extent that they were consistent with the objective of containing
inflation; following the international financial crisis in the late 1980s, the real exchange
rate depreciated and monetary policy was aimed at limiting the negative effects of
excessive exchange rate volatility. These measures were accompanied by  Fujimori’s
abandonment of, after almost two decades of failure, Peru’s previous industrialization-
based paradigm of development; this model was replaced by a new scheme in which
markets played a central role. International pressures, represented by the World Bank and
IMF, played a crucial role in this transformation.
Potential Determinants of Exchange Rate Policies
External Shocks
As Peru is a small and open economy, external factors are likely to affect directly and
indirectly both the adoptions of a particular exchange rate policy and the exchange rate
level. As is well known, a terms of trade deterioration usually requires a depreciation of
the real exchange rate. If the exchange rate is fixed, the required real depreciation could be
obtained either by reducing the domestic price level or devaluing the local currency.  The
first option is usually difficult to achieve due to downward nominal rigidities prevailing in
the economy. Therefore, a sustained and significant deterioration in the terms of trade
usually forces the devaluation of the local currency. Of course it is relevant to emphasize
that the more diversified the export base is, the less shock-prone the economy will be.
Thus, changes in the structure of exports could indirectly affect the exchange rate regime
and its level.
Fluctuations in international interest rates can also affect exchange rate policy.
Two of the most important effects of these fluctuations are their impacts on fiscal
accounts and capital flows. Its impact on fiscal deficits is positively correlated with the
                                                       
4 The fact that real appreciation was widespread in Latin America during the 1990s leads one to believe13
level of foreign debt, whereas the effect on capital inflows on the economy is largely
affected by the degree of openness of the capital account.
Intellectual Climate, Relation with Overall Policy Orientation and Other External
Constraints
The international environment is certainly relevant in the adoption of exchange rate
policies. Sustainable exchange rate policies need to be consistent with a general policy
orientation and the international environment. For example, floating rates operate better
when capital and goods are free to move. Furthermore, a fixed exchange rate can impose
severe risks in countries with relatively weak financial institutions and open capital
accounts. This is consistent with the evidence that a larger percentage of countries have
more flexible exchange rates now than twenty years ago (see Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1995).
A casual look of the Peruvian experience of the last fifty years suggests that  when
the economy has been more liberalized, the exchange rate has tended to float, whereas in
periods of greater government intervention in the economy, the exchange rate has been
more fixed. For example, during the 1950s the floating exchange rate system worked
better in an environment of high capital mobility of factors and very low protection. Once
the government started to intervene more heavily, promoting the manufacturing sector, the
exchange rate was fixed. Similarly, in the 1990s the process of structural reforms and the
complete liberalization of capital and current accounts made a flexible system more
natural.
Another related instrument is trade policy. It is very easy to draw links between
trade and exchange rate policies. For example, for the import competing sector, exchange
rate and trade policies can be substitutes. Different combinations of levels of the real
exchange rates and tariffs or quotas can equally protect the sector.  In the Peruvian
experience, this can be seen in the 1960s and 1970s. During those years, the low exchange
rate, consistent with low food prices and cheap inputs and capital goods, was
accompanied by a tariff structure that granted high protection to final goods
                                                                                                                                                                    
that it was more related to external factors as suggested by Calvo, Leiderman and Reinhart (1993).14
manufacturers. This point will be discussed further below. Similarly, the export sector has
been compensated with export subsides that averaged 20%.
5
Distributional Issues and Interest Groups
As the world grows more integrated, both in goods and financial assets, the exchange rate
becomes the most relevant price in the economy.  As a consequence, various groups are
affected by exchange rate policies and try to influence it. Frieden (1994) maintains that, in
general, tradable producers will prefer a weak (i.e., depreciated) exchange rate while non-
tradable producers will favor a strong (i.e., appreciated) RER. Similarly, domestic
producers are expected to favor more flexible exchange rates. However, it is necessary to
take into account heterogeneity within the tradable sector. In general, one would expect
the import-competing sector and the export-oriented sector to favor a more depreciated
currency. However, for years the import competing manufacturing sector has been
protected by high tariffs on final manufactured goods, which makes the sector non-
tradable de facto. If that is the case, the domestically oriented manufacturing sector would
favor an appreciated currency in periods of high protection while demanding a more
depreciated currency when protection is low.
Similarly, the extent to which the export-oriented sector is affected depends on its
cost structure. Ex-ante one would expect the mining sector to be less affected by the real
exchange rate due to its highly dollarized cost structure, while more labor-intensive
nontraditional exporters should be more RER sensitive. It is thus hypothesized that
nontraditional exporters represented by the  Asociación de  Exportadores (ADEX) are
more concerned with the evolution of the real exchange rate.
Another issue related to interest groups is the effect of the degree of dollarization.
One would expect that creditors are more concentrated than depositors and, to that
extent, would be able to exert more pressure to avoid a devaluation or a high real
exchange rate depreciation (in the case of a floating system).  One caveat related to the
importance of interest groups as an explanatory variable of exchange rate policy choices is
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that some of the most prominent economic groups are widely diversified. Thus, while
certain parts of the group lose as a result of a particular policy, other parts gain. The need
to favor or fight a particular policy could thus be substantially lessened.
Political and Institutional Variables
Exchange rate policy is often used as a mechanism to provide short-term benefits for the
electorally significant urban population. For example, one should expect that, ceteris
paribus, the real exchange rate is more depreciated when governments take office and
more appreciated towards the end of their term. It is very likely, for instance, that the
probability of devaluation decreases significantly when elections are imminent. This is
partially because the negative income effect of the devaluation, as a result of the reduction
of real wages, is in the short run larger than the positive substitution effect. In the same
spirit, one would expect that on average democratic governments have a more appreciated
currency than dictatorships since the former are accountable for their actions.
Also worth noting is the effect of different political bases of government on
exchange rate policies. While some suggest that the degree of political stability can affect
exchange rate policy, this effect can go both ways.  On the one hand, a more stable
government can more easily obtain support for fixing the exchange rate. On the other
hand, a more unstable government may want to fix the exchange rate to gain credibility.
Determining which effect is likely to dominate is an empirical problem.
The role of the Central Bank and its willingness to finance fiscal deficits definitely
affect the exchange rate outcome. As the Central Bank becomes more independent, one
should expect a more contractionary monetary policy and, as a result, a more appreciated
exchange rate.
Methodology and Data
One challenge that faces studies involving institutional and political factors is to accurately
capture the variables one considers important. The present objective is to provide some
statistical tests of exchange rate policy choices. Of course, given the small sample size and
the fact that institutional variables change very slowly over time, the results can be only16
suggestive of the importance of certain factors. More importantly, it is very hard to
measure accurately some of the effects suggested in the  preceding  discussion. The
statistical analysis of this section is thus followed by a more detailed description of
particular episodes.
Regime Choice
The objective in this case is to explain the choice of exchange rate regime. In this case, the
dependent variable is discrete according to the different exchange rate regimes available. It
is worth mentioning at this point that the choice of a particular exchange rate regime
usually represents underlying preferences about the degree of volatility, the level of the
real exchange rate, and the level of inflation, among other factors. These preferences are
taken into account in an effort to capture regime choice.
A multinomial logit model is thus proposed.
6 The variable y takes the value 0,2…J,
where J + 1 is the number of exchange regimes available.  The probability of a particular
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With regard to the exchange rate regime variable, different possible classifications
of exchange rate regimes are possible. One approach is the  IMF classification, which
encompasses the following regimes:  i) Currencies pegged to a single currency or a
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composite of currencies; ii) currencies whose flexibility is limited in terms of a single
currency or a group of currencies; and, iii) managed and independent floating.
The classification is not useful for the present objectives because it does not
distinguish, within the second group, between systems intended to control inflation and
those intended to maintain a desired RER level. In order to take that distinction into
account, the following classification is proposed: i) currency pegged to a currency or to a
group of currencies; ii) forward-looking crawling peg; iii) backward-looking crawling peg;
iv) floating (including dirty floating); and v) periods of collapse or crisis.
As mentioned above, at least theoretically the choice of a regime implies certain
preferences regarding underlying objectives, particularly the degree of inflation and the
level of appreciation. The exchange rate has been used in Latin America in general and
Peru in particular on several occasions as an instrument to fight in inflation, generally at a
cost of real appreciation. At other times the exchange rate has been used to enhance
competitiveness at the cost of higher inflation. This is the basic tradeoff in exchange rate
policy.
In order to illustrate this point, Table 1 shows the average levels of inflation and
real exchange rates for the different exchange rate regimes. Not surprisingly, the fixed
exchange rate is associated with the lowest level of inflation and with the more
appreciated real exchange rate, whereas the periods of backward-looking pegs are
associated with the highest inflation (if periods of collapse or crisis are excluded) and a
more depreciated currency. Other variables that affect the level of inflation or the real
exchange rate are not included, but the results are nonetheless interesting.
Table 1. Inflation and Real Exchange Rates Under Different Regimes
Regime    Inflation Real Exchange Rate
Fixed 18.5% 93.03
Collapse 2500% 122.12
F-L crawling peg 67.8% 108.53
B-L crawling peg 107% 136.59
Floating 25.2% 104.2718
The results suggest an ordered estimation. For example, periods of backward-
looking crawling pegs are associated with relatively high inflation and real exchange rate
level. This is not surprising since, in general, these systems are aimed at achieving a
depreciated real exchange rate, usually at the cost of inflation. Similarly, periods of fixed
exchange rate usually are characterized for low inflation and an appreciated real exchange
rate
Due to these characteristic and the small sample size, regimes  0 and 2 have been
regrouped, and regimes are reclassified regimes in the following order: regime 0: fixed and
forward-looking crawling pegs; regime 1: pure and dirty floating; regime 2: crisis; and
regime 3: backward-looking crawling pegs.
In order to account for regime choice, the following explanatory variables are
proposed:
 i) Log of level of inflation lagged (inflation(-1)) . This variable is expected to have a
negative sign, which implies that fixed exchange rates are consistent only with low
inflation
ii) Share of exports over GDP as a proxy of the power of this group to influence the
exchange rate policy. Here a distinction is made between mining and non-mining exporters
(XMIN(-1) and XNMIN(-1)). Both variables are expected to have a positive sign,
although the variable that reflects the mining sector should be less important. The tests
thus focus on the share of exporting sector in GDP as opposed to the size of the tradable
sector in general due to the lack of reliable data.
iii) Share of the domestically oriented manufacturing sector output  (approximated by total
industrial output less manufacturing exports) in total output as a measure of the ability of
this group to influence economic policy. This assumes that the exchange rate affects the
manufacturing sector through two different channels: first, the exchange rate affects the
price of inputs; second, competition with foreign products affects the price of the final
goods. MAGDP(-1) is manufacturing output as a percentage of total output lagged one
period. MAGDPTAR (-1) results from multiplying the previous variable by a dummy that
takes the value of 1 when tariffs are below 30%. Thus, MAGDPTAR (-1) equals
MAGDP(-1) if tariffs are below 30% and 0, otherwise. As a result, when the economy is19
closed due to high tariffs or quantitative restrictions, the manufacturing sector will benefit
from a more appreciated currency and will favor fixed regimes or forward-looking
crawling pegs.
iv) A dummy that qualifies the type of government (DICT=1 if dictatorship, 0 otherwise).
As mentioned before, one should expect that the variable  has a negative sign as
dictatorships should be less concerned with keeping an appreciated real exchange rate.
 v) Percentage of population in the urban sector, measured by URB. One should expect a
larger urban population to be more concerned with an appreciated real exchange rate. The
sign of the coefficient is expected to be positive.
The results appear in the first row of Table 2.















































*Excludes periods of exchange rate collapse.
Note: t-statistics in parentheses.20
Before interpreting the coefficients, one should notice that the effect of an increase
in the explanatory variables on the probabilities of a particular exchange rate system is not
unambiguously determined by the coefficients (see Greene, 1997). Indeed, it can only be
determined with extra calculation. Nevertheless, the sign of the effects of the explanatory
variables on the two ends of the ordered choices is correctly determined by the coefficients
of the above equation.
The sign of the coefficient of inflation is not significant, although the sign is as
expected. The sign of the manufacturing sector is also as predicted, and it is significant:
for high tariff levels the manufacturing sector will favor a fixed exchange rate system,
whereas the presence of low tariff levels may cause manufacturers to be more concerned
with a high real exchange rate. For the export sector, either in mining or other activities,
coefficients are not significant. The variable for urbanization (URB) is not significant and
has the opposite sign. The variable for type of government (DIC) suggests a relation
opposite to what was expected.
The lack of significance of the inflation coefficient is not totally surprising. This is
probably due to the non-linearity of the relation, which even the smoothing filter fails to
remove.
7 In column (2) inflation is smoothed differently (the smoother variable is now
called INFLATION1).
The results of this modification appear in column (2). While the coefficients of the
other variables are basically unaltered, inflation becomes significant at 5.3%.
8
Column (3) excludes periods of exchange rate collapse, because during those
periods there is not an explicit choice of regime. The results do not change significantly,
although the coefficient of mining exports becomes significant, whereas other non-mining
exports are significant but with the opposite sign.
These results are counterintuitive. Two explanations, though, may be offered.
First, the proxy of the export sector’s strength may be poorly captured by its share of
GDP. Its degree of cohesion, for example, can be equally important. Second, the export
sector can be less concerned about the exchange rate system if it is compensated through
                                                       
7 The inflation variable is measured as  p p    where , ) 1 log( + is the rate of inflation.
8 The use of dummy variables for hyperinflation were also attempted, but the likelihood function failed to21
other mechanisms. (These issues are discussed in greater detail below.)
It is worth mentioning that the variable that measures the effect of the type of
government on the regime choice enters with the unexpected sign, and at the borderline of
significance. These results could be explained by the fact that, unlike other military
governments in Latin America, the Peruvian regime had a socialist orientation.
                                                                                                                                                                    
converge.22
Real Exchange Rate Targeting
A second line of research will try to explain the level of the exchange rate. As stated
above, the government can affect the level of the exchange rate, at least in the short run,
even if in the long run the rate is going to return to its equilibrium value.
The real exchange rate is affected by both fundamental and non-fundamental
variables. Fundamental variables include terms of trade, non-policy induced openness, a
measure of productivity, and long-term capital flows. Changes in these variables affect the
real exchange rate, though changes in the equilibrium exchange rate do not  necessarily
reflect an explicit objective of the government with regards to the level of the real
exchange rate. The theory clearly states the expected effects of each fundamental variable
on the RER.
9 Thus, an improvement in the terms of trade could be the result either of an
increase in the demand for domestic output or a reduction in the relative supply of
domestic output. In both scenarios the exchange rate is going to be appreciated.  An
increase in domestic productivity relative to the rest of the world also appreciates the
exchange rate as a result of the Balassa-Samuelson effect, and an increase in capital
inflows increases the demand for domestic output and results in an appreciation of RER.
Finally, a reduction in tariff levels reduces the demand for domestic output and results in
the depreciation of RER. Other non-fundamental variables will also affect real exchange
rate levels. Those variables will be similar to the RHS variables used in the ordered logit
model of the previous section.
The following model is estimated:
LnRER X X F F NF NF = + + b b e (1)
where  X X F NF   and   represent fundamental and non-fundamental variables respectively and
e  is an error term, probably autocorrelated.
Alternatively, Equation (1) could have been estimated directly by following two
steps: first, estimating the degree of misalignment and, second, explaining it as a function
of political or institutional variables that reflect government action. The level of
misalignment would be the error term in the regression of the fundamental variables on the
                                                       
9 See Edwards, 1988 and Williamson, 1995.23
real exchange rate. Thus it would be possible to estimate:
LnRER X X F F NF NF - = + b b e
which would be equivalent to the previous one if at the small sample level the regressors
X X F NF  and   are orthogonal, which is not necessarily the case.
In order to estimate Equation (1) it is necessary to determine whether series are
stationary.  Existing unit root tests are generally of low power for a short sample and very
often fail to reject the hypothesis of a unit root. The existing literature finds that the RER
converges to its long run trend. For example, Frankel and Rose (1995), using a panel for
150 countries, found that the average half time of deviation from PPP (once time trends
are adjusted) is approximately four and a half years. Other studies have been consistent
with those estimations.
This suggests that exchange rates are trend-stationary as opposed to difference-
stationary and, therefore, more traditional econometric techniques of estimation can be
used. In line with this, it is assumed that variables are stationary and Generalized Least
Squares are used, due to the existence of autocorrelation on the residuals, to estimate the
equation above. The estimates appear in Table 3. The variables are similar to the ones
used in the previous subsection. Two extra variables are introduced as well: capital inflows
(Kflows) and productivity measured by the Solow residual (Solow).
The results indicate that among the fundamental variables both productivity and
capital inflows are significant. Among the non-fundamental variables, again the variables
that capture the manufacturing sector are significant.
It should be kept in mind that the derivative of an increase in the importance of the
manufacturing sector is:
b b 3 4 + d
where  d is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when tariffs are below 30%.
Therefore, the results confirm the priors, as well as the priors in the previous section that
b3 is negative and  b4 is positive. This is not surprising. For years high tariffs, in place in
Peru from 1964 until 1990, except for a short interval in the late 1970s, have implied that
most of the manufacturing sector would be non-tradable and, therefore, favoring more
appreciated currency. On the other hand in the 1950s and 1990s, years of low protection,24
the manufacturing sector faced competition from imported goods, and its stance toward
exchange rate policy is less clear
Table 3


































Note: t-statistics in parentheses.25
Similarly to the estimations in the ordered logit, the effect of the importance of the
export sector on the real exchange rate is not significant, which raises doubts regarding
how well the variable captures the export sector’s ability to exert pressure.
One variable that has not been used, and may have potential importance, as
mentioned above, is export subsidies (CERTEX). Loosely speaking, exporters that receive
the export subsidies will have a total profitability, which will be affected by:
10
ln(( )( )) ln ln( ) RER certex RER certex 1 1 + = + +
which implies that if in the presence of the RER as a left-hand side variable to explain, the
existence of export subsidies will reduce the pressure of the export sector for a higher real
exchange rate. The intuition is that compensation CERTEX reduces pressure for a more
depreciated currency. Since those subsides did not exist before 1970 and were eliminated
at the beginning of the Fujimori administration in 1990, they cannot be included in the full
sample. The regression is therefore run for the sub-sample 1970-1989. The results appear
in column (2) of Table 4.
Of course, results with a very small sample must be interpreted with caution. Still,
the results regarding the preferences of the manufacturing sector hold. CERTEX has the
correct sign and is significant at 10%. This can be seen as mildly supporting the hypothesis
that the existence of export subsidies reduces pressure for a more depreciated exchange
rate, in an environment in which economic groups are highly diversified and to that extent
might prefer a direct export subsidy.
As in previous estimations, the coefficients that attempt to measure the export
sector interests are not significant, either for mining or other export activities. This
contradicts the prior that the non-mining export sector should press for a depreciated
currency.
                                                       
10 The equation is not exact because the RER also affects the price of imported inputs; however, as long as
technological coefficients are constant, the equation will hold.26
Elections and the Real Exchange Rate
It was hypothesized above that on several occasions the exchange rate has been
manipulated for electoral purposes. One would expect an appreciated real exchange rate
before elections for a variety of reasons. First, an appreciated exchange rate is usually
consistent with low inflation, which governments might be interested in delivering.
Second, a nominal depreciation usually leads to a real depreciation and is contractionary in
the short term (see Agenor and Montiel, 1996). For that reason, governments may be
reluctant to devalue before elections, and this reluctance can contribute to an appreciated
RER. Third, governments tend to spend more before elections and that per se appreciates
the real exchange rate. After elections, depreciations are less costly in political terms.
Figure 1 shows the real exchange rate nine months before and after presidential
elections. Even though it is necessary to be cautious about drawing general conclusions
from a small number of elections, as Peru has held only six elections in the last fifty years,
the almost picture-perfect political business cycle is nonetheless surprising: a continuous
appreciation consistently occurs before elections and a depreciation immediately
afterward.
Figure 1.  Elections and Real Exchange Rate































This section, complementary to the previous econometric analysis, analyzes three
particular episodes of Peruvian exchange rate policy in order to illustrate how the choice
of the exchange rate regime is also affected by non-economic variables.
Adoption of Fixed Exchange Rate in 1959: Preference for a Strong Currency and
Reluctance to Devalue
As previously mentioned, the government switched from a floating exchange rate to a de
facto fixed exchange rate in the late 1950s and de jure in 1961. Since average annual
economic growth during the 1950s was 5% and exchange rate volatility was not
particularly high, it is interesting to explain such a change in policy.
It is important to highlight that a floating exchange rate was consistent with overall
policy orientation in the 1950s, when goods and capital were free to move in response to
market forces. Thus, the adoption of the fixed exchange rate could be better understood if
one explains the abandonment of the laissez-fare paradigm that prevailed in the 1950s and
the adoption of a development paradigm aimed at promoting industrialization.
One can advance several explanations for why the development paradigm based on
exporting raw materials was questioned during the mid-1950s.  First, during those years,
there was an important change in exports’ profitability. As Thorp and Bertram (1978, p.
218) show, while total returned value in the mining sector as a percentage of gross value
of output was 72% in 1952, it fell to 53% in 1960, due mainly to high repatriation rates.
Similarly, there were symptoms of depletion of natural resources. This was very clear in
petroleum, but it was also true for other non-mineral exports such as cotton and sugar.
Second, the external environment was a very important factor. CEPAL’s theories
about economic development encouraged a gradual policy shift aimed at benefiting the
incipient manufacturing sector, as opposed to the still powerful export sector.  Similarly,
other researchers like Singer, Lewis, Hirshman and Myrdal questioned the free trade
paradigm and proposed the idea of balanced growth and the need for import substitution.28
Indeed, the  Ley de  Promoción Industrial of 1959 was prepared under the
“encouragement” of a CEPAL mission.
Third, there were also major social and institutional changes. Population growth
rose from 1.9% in the 1940s to 2.2% in the 1950s, reaching 2.7% by 1961. This
development was accompanied by urbanization, as population in cities larger than 2,500
inhabitants rose from 18% in 1940 to 39% in 1961; during this period Lima grew from
half a million to two million people. The increasing white-collar employment that
produced by urbanization resulted in the emergence of the middle class and a shift in
politics.
Peru’s political life was further reshaped by an increase in literacy rates, which
tripled the number of voters between 1950 and 1956. The election of President Prado in
1956, thanks to a convivencia with the middle class APRA political party, was an effort by
the traditional oligarchic system to extend its basis of political support in a time of change.
However, as Fitzgerald (1978) states: “...[It] was the last of the traditional oligarchic
administrations: it was a regime which preserved, in the context of urbanization and
industrialization which had taken place in the previous two decades, a serious divergence
between the traditional political and emerging social structures.” The new forces started to
question the export orientation of the oligarchic system, and the newly important urban
population demanded a strong currency in order to contain the prices of foodstuffs, most
of which were imported.
Another significant issue is that even in the mid-fifties there were some joint
ventures between the local elite and foreign firms in the manufacturing sector. While these
at first primarily involved export processing, they were followed relatively soon by other
joint ventures dedicated to pure import substitution. Those were stimulated by the belief
that industrialization was necessary to increase employment and growth. Thus, the local
elite was more willing to support the promotion of industrial growth. Thorp (1978, 255)
also mentions that the withdrawal of the local elite from the export sector implied that
their allies, foreign firms in the export sector, lost leverage with the government in an
increasingly nationalistic environment.
As seen above, the adoption of a fixed exchange rate, coupled with an inflation29
rate above international levels implied an appreciation of the exchange rate beyond what
any reasonable gain in productivity could warrant. While the balance of payments was
healthy until 1965, mainly because of the country’s fishing boom, the balance of payments
deteriorated steeply in 1966 as a result of worsening terms of trade and a policy-induced
real appreciation. This situation was aggravated by a reduction in capital inflows.
The reduction of the unsustainable current account deficit though the usual method
of expenditure-switching and reducing policies was more complicated than in previous
crises, as Belaúnde’s political base was largely resistant to devaluation. These sectors
benefited from postponing a devaluation, which at least in the short term kept food, input,
and industrial equipment prices low and contained the government’s external debt burden.
Thus, unlike a previous episode in 1957 in which devaluation was undertaken without
major opposition, the perceived political losses of a devaluation in the mid-1960s were
substantial, as some of the most important players were against it.
The government only devalued in 1967 when there was no other choice. Possible
alternatives such as raising taxes and imposing exchange controls were unacceptable to the
IMF and to the APRA, which dominated the congress.
1990s: Adoption of Floating Exchange Rates and the Appreciation of the Exchange
Rate
In August 1990, the newly elected government of Alberto Fujimori launched a
stabilization program aimed at eliminating the hyperinflation inherited from the previous
regime. Unlike other successful stabilizations in the region, the program did not fix the
exchange rate but controlled the money supply after an initial reliquefication. In the
following years, the Central Bank intervened only by attempting to depreciate the currency
to a degree that was consistent with the objective of reducing inflation.
The government’s initial choice of exchange rate system seemed to be more the
result of the absence of reserves to credibly commit to a peg and the reluctance of
international institutions to provide funds before the adjustment was made. In that sense,
initial conditions inherited by Fujimori’s government largely explain its choice of exchange
rate regime. Furthermore, given this initial decision, it is relatively easy to understand the
duration of such a regime until now.  To the extent that stylized facts show that exchange-30
rate-based stabilizations are expansionary at the beginning and contractionary afterwards,
while money-based stabilizations display opposite effects, it seemed reasonable to maintain
a the flexible regime once the main economic costs (the initial contraction) had been paid.
Given the relatively low volatility of the nominal and real exchange rate in Peru in
the 1990s there was certainly no consensus for switch to a more fixed regime. The country
was receiving benefits usually associated with a fixed exchange rate without bearing the
costs.
Concluding Remarks
A variety of factors have affected exchange rate policymaking in Peru in the last fifty
years. Besides the economic variables that theoretically determine optimal exchange rate
policies, political economy and institutional variables figure prominently. In fact,  Peruvian
exchange rate policies in the last years should not be seen in isolation from a government’s
overall policy stance. Exchange rate polices have generally been used, and very often
misused, to achieve changing objectives. These have included reducing inflation,
sustaining an appreciated real exchange rate that supports industrialization, and promoting
exports.
These goals have been apparent in the choice of exchange rate regime, the
targeting of exchange rates, and the timing of devaluations or other nominal adjustments.
Quantitative and qualitative analysis suggest that, besides the usual fundamentals,
exchange rate policymaking can be seen as the interaction of several factors rather than the
product of factors in isolation from one another.
For example, the results support the hypothesis that in an environment of high
protection the manufacturing sector would prefer a fixed exchange rate, usually an
appreciated one, that reduces the domestic currency prices of imported inputs and
machinery. The domestic prices of final goods should not be affected by the real exchange
rate since by virtue of the high protection to final goods, manufacturing goods become de
facto non-tradables. In a more open and competitive environment with low tariffs,
manufacturers’ exchange rate preferences are less clear. Similarly, though less
conclusively, it has been found that export subsidies, which Peru employed for twenty31
years, reduce political pressures on exchange rate policy. This is consistent with findings
on preferences of the manufacturing sector, given that export subsidies have been aimed at
manufactured exports.
Regarding other export groups, two factors can explain why exports’ share of
GDP is not a good measure of their lobbying power.  One is the difficulty of developing a
variable that can appropriately capture the political pressures that the export sector could
have exerted in regard to exchange rate policy.  In this case exports’ share of GDP does
not seem to provide a good measure of exporters’ power to influence macroeconomic
policy.  A second factor is that export groups were dismantled at an early stage of the
period analyzed; this neutralized their ability to exert political pressure. The drastic
agrarian reform implemented by the military government in the late 1960s,  which
transferred property on coastal haciendas to workers, destroyed sugar and cotton
exporters’ ability to exert political pressure. Similarly, the nationalization of mining and oil
enterprises prevented other any other major group of exporters from shaping  economic
policy.  These transformations may also explain why, although the export share of GDP
remained relatively high during the whole period, that variable serves as a poor proxy for
exporters’ ability to influence economic policy. Of course, one must be cautious in
drawing strong conclusions from one country time series study. Nevertheless, the results
are consistent with those obtained by cross- country study on this matter.
The statistical analysis was complemented by a description of two exchange rate
related episodes. In the first, the shift towards a fixed (and in general more appreciated)
exchange rate in the late 1960s resulted from growing interest in industrialization and an
increase in the size of the urban population. These developments made devaluations more
costly in political terms. In the second episode, the adoption of a floating exchange rate in
Peru in the 1990s was initially due to the scarcity of reserves that could have been used to
stabilize the exchange rate with a credible peg.  Switching to a more active exchange rate
policy was not viable, since the social preferences favored low inflation rates. Further
evidence that exchange rate policies are determined largely on the basis of non-economic
considerations is the behavior of the RER around presidential elections. The RER in Peru
tends to appreciate before elections and depreciate after.32
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